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Information Spillovers in Asset Markets  
with Correlated Values†
By Vladimir Asriyan, William Fuchs, and Brett Green*
We study information spillovers in a dynamic setting with correlated 
assets owned by privately informed sellers. In the model, a trade 
of one asset can provide information about the value of other 
assets. Importantly, the information content of trading behavior 
is endogenously determined. We show that this endogeneity leads 
to multiple equilibria when assets are sufficiently correlated. The 
equilibria are ranked in terms of both trade volume and efficiency. 
The model has implications for policies targeting post-trade 
transparency. We show that introducing post-trade transparency can 
increase or decrease welfare and trading volume depending on the 
asset correlation, equilibrium being played, and the composition of 
market participants. (JEL D82, D83, G14, G18)
When asset values are correlated and sellers are privately informed, a trade of one 
asset can be informative about the value of other assets, which can in turn influence 
the trading decision of others. These “information spillovers” can play an important 
role in determining the manner and the efficiency with which assets are reallocated.
In this paper, we develop a stylized framework to understand the role of informa-
tion spillovers. The model involves two sellers (for convenience, we refer to them 
as Ann and Bob), each with an indivisible asset that has a value which is either low 
or high. Each seller is privately informed about the value of their asset. There is 
common knowledge of gains from trade, but buyers face a lemons problem (Akerlof 
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1970). Trading takes place via a competitive market over the course of two periods. 
In the first period, potential buyers can approach a seller and make offers. If a seller 
rejects all offers in the first period, then she can entertain more offers from new buy-
ers in the second period. In this setting, inefficiencies can arise from delays in trade 
or a failure to trade altogether.
The key ingredient of our model is that the asset values are positively correlated. 
Provided that transactions are observable, a trade of one asset (or lack thereof) can 
provide information to buyers about the value of the other asset. Importantly, the 
information content of observed trading behavior is endogenous. To understand the 
nature of the endogeneity, suppose that in the first period, Bob trades with a high 
probability if he owns a low-value asset and does not trade if he owns a high-value 
asset. Then, because the asset values are correlated, observing whether Bob trades 
has information content about the value of Ann’s asset. On the other hand, if Bob 
plans to sell the asset in the first period regardless of its value, then observing him 
trade is completely uninformative about the quality of Ann’s asset.
Because Bob’s trading strategy influences the amount of information revealed 
about Ann’s asset, it effects her decision of when to sell, which in turn influences the 
amount of information revealed about Bob’s asset and thus also effects his decision. 
This strategic interaction is the primary mechanism underlying our results.
In equilibrium, low-value assets are more likely to trade in the first period.1 
Therefore, observing a transaction in the first period is “bad news” about the other 
asset. The strategic interaction can be decomposed into two separate effects, which 
we refer to as the bad news and good news effects. The bad news effect is that, as 
Bob trades more aggressively, it becomes more likely from Ann’s perspective that 
bad news will be revealed, which therefore induces Ann to trade more aggressively. 
The good news effect is that, conditional on not observing a trade by Bob, the mar-
ket’s belief about Ann’s asset is more favorable, which leads to higher prices and 
induces Ann to trade less aggressively.
When the bad news effect dominates, there is a strategic complementarity 
between the sellers. The more likely Bob is to accept a low offer, the more inclined 
Ann becomes to also accept a low offer. When the good news effect dominates, just 
the opposite relationship obtains. It turns out that the good news effect dominates 
when Bob uses a less aggressive strategy while the bad news effect dominates when 
Bob uses a more aggressive strategy. Hence, the optimal trading behavior of Ann is 
non-monotonic (first decreasing and eventually increasing) in Bob’s behavior.
After characterizing the nature of the strategic interaction, we show that all equi-
libria must be symmetric and feature strictly positive probability of trade in both 
periods (Proposition 3). We then establish our main result (Theorem 1), which states 
that when information spillovers are strong (correlation is high), there are three 
equilibria. The equilibria are ranked both in terms of the volume of trade that takes 
place and the total welfare. The higher is the volume of trade in the first period, the 
more efficiently assets are reallocated and the higher is total welfare. Interestingly, 
comparative statics with respect to the strength of information spillovers vary across 
1 This feature is common in dynamic models with adverse selection and often referred to as the “skimming” 
property. 
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equilibria. Thus, increasing the level of correlation between assets can lead to higher 
or lower trading volume and welfare depending on which equilibrium is played.
To provide intuition as to why this multiplicity obtains, consider the extreme case 
in which the assets are perfectly correlated. Suppose that Bob trades with proba-
bility one if he owns a low-type asset and with probability zero otherwise. If Ann 
delays trade in the first period, then her type will be perfectly revealed by whether 
Bob trades. Conditional on observing a trade by Bob in the first period, buyers will 
correctly infer that Ann has a low-value asset and offer a low price in the second 
period. Therefore, Ann has no incentive to delay trade if she has a low-value asset 
and strictly prefers to trade in the first period. Hence, there exists an equilibrium in 
which both low-value assets trade with probability one in the first period.
Next, suppose that Bob trades with some intermediate probability in the first 
period if he owns a low-type asset and with probability zero otherwise. From Ann’s 
perspective, there is still positive probability that her type will be revealed if buyers 
observe a trade by Bob (the bad news effect), but there is also some chance that Bob 
does not trade, in which case buyers correctly infer that Ann is more likely to have a 
good asset making them willing to offer a high price in the second period (the good 
news effect). The potential for getting a high price in the second period makes Ann 
indifferent between trading in the first period, and hence she is willing to trade with 
some intermediate probability. Thus, there also exists an equilibrium in which both 
low-value assets trade with an intermediate probability in the first period.
Though our model is stylized and abstracts from institutional details of specific 
markets, the economic forces we identify could apply to a variety of asset markets, 
both real and financial. For example, the assets could refer to different tranches 
of an asset-backed security or corporate debt issuance, where both the issuer and 
certain investors have access to private information about the underlying collateral 
or firm, which was not reliably disclosed. Allegations along these lines were made 
against numerous banks and asset managers in the aftermath of the financial crisis.2 
Another possible application is real estate markets, where sellers of nearby homes 
have private information about the desirability of the location and neighborhood 
trends. Indeed, Kurlat and Stroebel (2015) provide evidence that private information 
about neighborhood characteristics affects home prices, while Adelino, Gerardi, 
and Hartman-Glaser (2016) document evidence consistent with a dynamic adverse 
selection problem in secondary markets for mortgages.
The extent to which information spillovers can impact market behavior depends 
crucially on the ability of agents to observe previous transactions. In recent years, 
websites such as Zillow, RedFin, and Trulia have drastically increased the degree 
of transparency in real estate markets (Richardson and Zumpano 2012). Potential 
buyers and sellers now have instantaneous access to the entire history of recent 
transactions, whereas previously this information was only easily accessible to bro-
kers.3 Alti, Engelberg, and Parsons (2011) present direct evidence of information 
spillovers in real estate markets that is consistent with our theoretical predictions. 
They find that a sale of one home increases the probability that a neighboring home 
2 See www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml for a list of such allegations. 
3 See Gordon (2012) for a broader overview of how transparency in real estate markets has increased worldwide 
in recent years. 
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sells in the near future even after controlling for demand. These effects are stron-
gest in homogeneous  markets (where presumably the correlation between houses is 
higher) and can reduce  time-on-the-market by as much as 20 percent.
Post-trade (or transactional) transparency has also received significant attention 
from policymakers in financial markets. In July 2002, the corporate bond mar-
ket underwent a significant change when regulators implemented Transactions 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), which mandated that prices and vol-
ume of completed transactions be publicly disclosed. Since then, TRACE has been 
expanded to include other asset classes. There are also ongoing efforts by regula-
tors to increase transparency in the markets for numerous derivatives (Title VII of 
 Dodd-Frank) and European corporate bonds (Learner 2011).
To explore the implications of post-trade transparency, we modify the model 
slightly so that buyers only observe transactions on the platform in which they par-
ticipate. Introducing transactional transparency in such an environment can lead to 
equilibrium multiplicity. Depending on which equilibrium is played, trading volume 
can increase or decrease and welfare can increase or remain unchanged. Our find-
ings thus can help explain why Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) 
and Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) find that market participants gain from 
the introduction of TRACE, while Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) see no 
effect within a subclass of securities, and Asquith, Covert, and Pathak (2013) find 
significantly different results for bonds that were part of the different phases of the 
TRACE program.
Regulators often argue that transactional transparency “creates a level playing 
field for all investors” (NASD 2005). To investigate this claim, we extend our model 
to a setting where an insider (e.g., a broker-dealer) has better access to transaction 
data than others (e.g., retail or institutional investors). We confirm that  post-trade 
transparency indeed reduces the trading profits of the insider, which may help 
explain broker-dealers’ resistance to the proposed changes. Mandating post-trade 
transparency also mitigates the trading losses of investors who are naïve about the 
fact that they face competition from an insider. However, if investors are sophisti-
cated, then post-trade transparency has no effect on their welfare and can lead to 
an overall reduction in efficiency relative to an opaque market. Thus, “leveling the 
playing field” may come at a cost and the desirability of such a policy depends on 
the composition of market participants.
Related Literature.—Our work is related to Daley and Green (2012, 2016), who 
study a setting in which information is exogenously revealed to uninformed buyers. 
They show that when information (or news) quality is exogenous, the unique equi-
librium involves periods of no trade. In contrast, we show that when information is 
endogenously revealed by the trading behavior of other market participants, there 
can exist multiple equilibria all of which require trade to occur with strictly positive 
probability in each period.
The transparency of offers has been studied by Nöldeke and van Damme (1990), 
Swinkels (1999), Hörner and Vieille (2009), and Fuchs, Öry, and Skrzypacz (2016). 
Our work differs in two important respects. First, these papers consider a setting 
with a single seller, whereas we explore the strategic considerations of multiple sell-
ers with  correlated assets. Second, they consider pre-trade transparency with respect 
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to offers that are made, whereas we consider post-trade transparency with respect 
to transactions that have taken place. The two types of transparency have different 
implications. We find transaction transparency can lead to multiple equilibria and 
weakly improves efficiency (with symmetric buyers), whereas offer transparency 
typically reduces efficiency.
There is also a large literature within accounting and finance studying the effect 
of public disclosure of firm specific information. Healy and Palepu (2001) and 
Verrecchia (2001) provide surveys of both the theoretical and empirical work in this 
area. One key difference is that this literature takes the information to be disclosed 
as given and studies the effects of whether, when, how much, and how frequently 
it is made public. Naik, Neuberger, and Viswanathan (1999) study trade disclosure 
in a (Kyle 1985) setting with risk averse agents. They show that disclosure in the 
first trading period reduces private information in the second trading period, but 
can increase price volatility and thus has ambiguous welfare effects. In our setting, 
agents are risk neutral yet public disclosure of trades can still lead to worse out-
comes when buyers are asymmetrically informed because it increases competition 
(and thus prices) giving the seller more incentive to (inefficiently) delay trade.
Kaya and Kim (2015) analyze a model with a single seller in which sequential 
buyers receive a private signal about the value of the asset. Instead, our focus is on 
the two-way interaction between trade and the information generated by it. The idea 
of a two-way feedback between trading activity and market informativeness is also 
present in Cespa and Vives (2015). They study a noisy rational expectations model 
and find that multiple equilibria can arise when noise-trader shocks are sufficiently 
persistent and informed buyers care only about their short-term returns. While our 
approaches are substantially different, their model also delivers equilibria that have 
high trading volume and market informativeness as well as equilibria in which trad-
ing volume and informativeness are low.
Finally, Drugov (2010, 2014) considers the related problem of information 
externalities among two bargaining pairs. There are two important differences with 
respect to this work. First, he considers a different market structure where there is 
only one buyer per seller rather than competing buyers. Second, in his model the 
value of the seller is independent of the value of the buyer, while in ours the values 
are correlated giving rise to a lemons problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we present the basic 
ingredients and conduct preliminary analysis. In Section II, we characterize the 
equilibria of the model and explore the effect of asset correlation on trading volume 
and welfare. In Section III, we explore the implications of post-trade transparency in 
opaque markets. Section IV concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
I. The Model
There are two sellers, indexed by  i ∈ {A, B} . Each seller owns one indivisi-
ble asset and is privately informed of her asset’s type, denoted by  θ i ∈ {L, H} .4 
Seller  i has a value  c θ for a type- θ asset, where  c L <  c H . The market for assets is 
4 The model and the results can be extended to an environment with an arbitrary number of sellers, as we show 
in Asriyan, Fuchs, and Green (2016). 
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 competitive—there are at least two identical buyers competing for assets in each 
period.5 The value of a type- θ asset to a buyer is  v θ and there is common knowledge 
of gains from trade,  v θ >  c θ , which can be motivated by, for example, preference 
shocks, liquidity constraints, or hedging demands.
There are two trading periods:  t ∈ {1, 2} . In each period, buyers can make offers 
to each seller. A buyer whose offer is rejected gets a payoff of zero and exits the 
game.6 The payoff to a buyer who purchases an asset of type  θ at price  p is given by
  v θ − p. 
Sellers discount future payoffs by a discount factor  δ ∈  (0, 1) . The payoff to a 
seller with an asset of type  θ , who agrees to trade at a price  p in period  t is
  (1 −  δ t−1 )  c θ +  δ t−1 p. 
If the seller does not trade at either date, his payoff is  c θ . All players are risk neu-
tral. One can interpret  c θ and  v θ as the present value of the flow payoffs from 
owning the asset to the seller and buyer, respectively.7 That is,  c θ =  ∑ t=1 ∞  δ t−1  x θ =  (1 − δ) −1  x θ , where  x θ is the seller’s expected flow payoff from owning a type- θ 
asset for one period.
The key feature of our model is that asset values are positively (but imperfectly) 
correlated. To model this correlation, let the unconditional distribution of  θ i be 
given by
  Pr ( θ i = L) = 1 − π, 
where higher  π ∈ (0, 1) corresponds to more favorable beliefs. The ex ante distri-
bution of  θ i conditional on  θ j is
  Pr ( θ i = L |  θ j = L) = λ, 
for some  λ ∈ (1 − π, 1) .8
5 Perfect competition among buyers is not essential for our results. In Section IIIB, we allow for asymmetries 
among buyers in which case the buyer side of the market makes positive profits. 
6 The assumption that buyers are “short-lived” (i.e., make offers in only one period) is, by now, fairly standard 
in this literature (e.g., Swinkels 1999; Kremer and Skrzypacz 2007; Hörner and Vieille 2009). The equilibria we 
construct are also equilibria in a model with long-lived buyers if offers are publicly observable. However, if offers 
are not observable, then a long-lived buyer has incentive to engage in a form of experimentation by submitting an 
offer that loses money in the first period (if it is accepted) in order to make a profitable one in the second period. 
Note that this issue arises even without multiple sellers and correlated assets. 
7 The fact that one asset sold or the timing of its sale does not change the intrinsic valuation for potential buyers 
of the other asset. Although these might be important considerations in some applications, we eliminate them from 
our analysis since our objective is to isolate the effects stemming from information spillovers. 
8 With perfect correlation (i.e.,  λ = 1 ), the set of equilibria is sensitive to the specification of off-equilibrium 
path beliefs. Nevertheless, in the online Appendix we show that the set of equilibria with perfect correlation is the 
limit of the set of equilibria as λ → 1. 
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Importantly, asset correlation introduces the possibility that a trade of one asset 
contains relevant information about the value of the other asset.9 To capture this 
 possibility, we assume that any transaction that occurs in the first period is observed 
by buyers prior to when they make their offers in the second period. For conve-
nience, we also assume that offers are made privately; the level of rejected offers is 
not observed by other buyers.10
Our primary interest is to explore how the correlation of asset values influences 
equilibrium trading behavior. To do so, we focus on primitives which satisfy the 
following assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 1:  π  v H + (1 − π)  v L <  c H .
ASSUMPTION 2:  v L < (1 − δ)  c L + δ  c H .
The first assumption, which we refer to as the “lemons” condition, asserts that 
the adverse selection problem is severe enough to rule out the first-best equilibrium 
in which both sellers trade in the first period with probability one (w.p. 1 ) regardless 
of their type. If the lemons condition does not hold, then the first-best outcome is 
an equilibrium. There can also exist another equilibrium in which trade is not fully 
efficient. Thus, information spillovers can distort an otherwise efficient market by 
introducing the possibility of learning and provide incentives for the high type to 
wait for a better price.11
The second assumption rules out the fully separating equilibrium in which the 
low type trades in the first period w.p. 1 and the high type trades in the second period 
w.p. 1 . Together, these two conditions rule out trivial equilibria in which information 
spillovers are irrelevant for equilibrium behavior.12
A. Strategies, Information Sets, and “News”
A strategy of a buyer is a mapping from his information set to a probability dis-
tribution over offers. In the first period (i.e., at  t = 1 ), a buyer’s information set 
is empty. In the second period, buyers know whether each asset traded in the first 
period. If asset  i trades in the first period, then it is efficiently allocated and it is 
without loss to assume that buyers do not make offers for it in the second period 
(Milgrom and Stokey 1982). If asset  i does not trade in the first period, buyers 
update their beliefs about  θ i based on two pieces of information: (i) the fact that 
seller  i did not trade in the first period and (ii) whether seller  j traded in the first 
period.
The second piece of information or “news” is commonly observed across all 
buyers and is denoted by  z i ∈ {b, g} (the reason for this notation will soon become 
9 For parsimony, we assume the type remains fixed over time. Our results can be generalized to a setting where 
asset types evolve over time (e.g., due to aggregate shocks). In such a setting, the relevance of information spillovers 
hinges on the lagged cross correlation between asset values, i.e.,  corr( θ j, t+1 ,  θ i, t ) . 
10 Fuchs, Öry, and Skrzypacz (2016) show that this specification is without loss in a setting with a single asset. 
11 This finding is similar to results in Daley and Green (2012) in which the introduction of exogenous news can 
reduce overall efficiency. 
12 To rule out fully separating equilibria only requires  v L < (1 − δ)  c L + δ  v H ; our stronger Assumption 2 fur-
ther simplifies exposition without affecting our main results. 
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apparent). If  z i = b , then seller  j traded in the first period. If  z i = g , then seller  j 
rejected all offers in the first period.
Remark 1: Our results remain unchanged if buyers also observe transaction 
prices. Because buyers are uninformed and make the offers, no additional informa-
tion (beyond whether a transaction occurred) is revealed by the price.
The strategy of each seller is a mapping from her information set to a probability 
of acceptance. Seller  i ’s information includes her type, her previous and current 
offers, as well as the information set of buyers.
B. Equilibrium Concept
We use Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) as our equilibrium concept. This has 
three implications. First, each seller’s acceptance rule must maximize her expected 
payoff at every information set taking buyers’ strategies and the other seller’s accep-
tance rule as given (seller optimality). Second, any offer in the support of a buy-
er’s strategy must maximize his expected payoff given his beliefs, other buyers’ 
strategies and the seller’s strategy (buyer optimality). Third, given their information 
set, buyers’ beliefs are updated according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible (belief 
consistency).
C. Preliminary Analysis
It is convenient to establish some basic properties all equilibria must satisfy. 
Because there are multiple buyers, their individual offers are not uniquely pinned 
down by PBE. We refer to the bid for asset  i at time  t as the maximal offer made 
across all buyers for asset  i at time  t .
Let  V( π ̃ ) ≡  π ̃  v H + (1 −  π ̃ )  v L denote buyer’s expected value for an asset given 
an arbitrary belief  π ̃ . Let  _ π ∈ (π, 1) be such that  V( _ π) =  c H , and let  π i denote the 
probability that buyers assign to  θ i = H just prior to making offers in the second 
period. In equilibrium,  π i is determined by belief consistency and the realization of 
news. Taking these beliefs as given, equilibrium play at  t = 2 corresponds to that 
of the familiar static market for lemons.
LEMMA 1: If seller  i does not trade in the first period then, in the second period:
 (i) if  π i <  _ π, then the bid is  v L and seller  i accepts only if  θ i = L ;
 (ii) if  π i >  _ π, then the bid is  V(  π i ) and seller  i accepts with probability one;
 (iii) if  π i =  _ π, then the bid is  c H = V(  π i ) with some probability  ϕ i ∈ [0, 1] 
and  v L otherwise.
A high-type seller will only accept a bid greater than  c H . Therefore, when the 
expected value of the asset is below  c H (i.e.,  π i <  _ π), there is no way for a buyer to 
attract a high-type seller without making a loss. Thus, buyers will trade only with 
the low types and competition pushes the bid price to  v L , implying (i). When the 
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expected value is above  c H (i.e.,  π i >  _ π), competition between buyers forces the 
equilibrium offer to be the expected value, implying (ii). In (iii), the expected value 
of the asset is exactly  c H and hence buyers are indifferent between offering  c H and 
trading with both types or offering  v L and only trading with the low type.
Continuation Values.—It follows from Lemma 1 that for a given belief and buyer 
mixing probability for asset  i ,  ( π i ,  ϕ i ) , the payoff to a high-type seller  i in the second 
period is
(1)  F H ( π i ,  ϕ i ) ≡ max { c H , V(  π i )}  
and a low type’s payoff in the second period is given by 




 v L 
 
if  π i <  _ π
   ϕ ic H + (1 −  ϕ i ) v L if  π i =  _π
V( π i )
 
if  π i >  _ π
.
Figure 1 illustrates how these payoffs depend on  π i and  ϕ i . Notice that if  π i =  _ π, 
the low-type seller’s payoff is not uniquely pinned down as it depends on the likeli-
hood that  c H is offered. Hence,  F L can take values in the interval  [  v L ,  c H ] if  π i =  _ π. 
On the other hand,  F H is independent of the probability that  c H is offered.
Given her information set in the first period, the seller  i ’s payoff in the second 
period is stochastic because buyers’ beliefs will depend on the news about asset  j and 
because buyers may mix over offers. Fixing a candidate equilibrium, the expected 
continuation value from rejecting the bid in the first period for seller  i of type  θ is
(3)  Q θ i =  (1 − δ) ·  c θ + δ ·  E θ {  F θ (  π i ,  ϕ i )}. 
LEMMA 2: In any PBE, the expected continuation value for the high type is strictly 
greater than that for the low type:  Q H i >  Q L i .
This is due to (i)  F H ≥  F L ; (ii) the flow payoff to a high type from delay is 
higher; and (iii) a high type rationally believes it is less likely that bad news will 
arrive and thus she expects a (weakly) better distribution of price offers in the sec-
ond period. Note that (iii) is true regardless of the first-period trading strategies used 
by the other seller. That is, any “good” news is more likely if  θ i = H than if  θ i = L 
and conversely.
Consider now the seller’s decision in the first period. The strict ranking of contin-
uation values implies that if a high type is willing to accept the bid in the first period, 
then a low type will strictly prefer to accept. By Assumption  1 , buyers’ prior beliefs 
are sufficiently pessimistic to rule out an offer weakly above  c H . Thus, buyers make 
offers that only a low-type seller will accept.
LEMMA 3: In the first period, the equilibrium outcome satisfies the following:
 (i) The bid for asset  i is  v L .
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 (ii) A high-type seller rejects the bid. A low-type seller accepts with probabil-
ity  σ i ∈ [0, 1) .
To see why  σ i must be strictly less than one, suppose to the contrary that  σ i = 1 . 
Then conditional on rejecting the offer, belief consistency requires that buyers believe 
seller  i is a high type w.p. 1 (regardless of  z i ) and thus the bid must be  v H in the sec-
ond period (by Lemma 1). But, then a low-type seller would get a higher payoff by 
not trading in the first period (see Assumption 2), violating optimality of the seller’s 
strategy. Thus, it must be that  σ i ∈ [0, 1) .
Updating.—As highlighted above, buyers’ beliefs in the second period determine 
equilibrium play. There are two ways in which the prior is updated between the first 
and second periods. First, conditional on seller  i rejecting the offer in the first period, 
buyers’ interim belief is given by
(4)  π  σ i  ≡ Pr ( θ i = H | reject at t = 1) =  π ____________ π + (1 − π) (1 −  σ i ) .
Second, before making their offers in the second period, buyers learn about any 
trades that took place in the first period. Since asset values are positively correlated 
and only low types trade in the first period, news that asset  j sold (i.e.,  z i = b ) will 
lead to a negative revision in beliefs, and  z i = g will lead to a positive revision.
Exactly how this news is incorporated into the posterior depends on the trading 
strategy of seller  j . It is useful to define first the probability of news  z i conditional 
on the type  θ i of seller, which we denote by  ρ θ i ( z i ) . Specifically, the probability of 
observing the event  z i = b , given seller  i is of type  θ is
(5)  ρ θ i (b) ≡ Pr  ( z i = b |  θ i = θ) =  σ j · Pr  ( θ j = L |  θ i = θ) . 
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Provided  σ j > 0 , we can use equations (4) and (5) to express the posterior prob-
ability of seller  i being high type after news  z as
(6)  π i (z;  σ i ,  σ j ) ≡ Pr ( θ i = H | i rejects at t = 1,  z i = z) 
 =   π  σ i  ·  ρ H 
i (z)  _______________________  π  σ i  ·  ρ H i (z) + (1 −  π  σ i  ) ·  ρ L i (z). 
To conserve on notation, we often suppress arguments of  π i . Notice that  π i (z) has 
the expected property that  π i (b) ≤  π  σ i  ≤  π i (g) .13 A few additional properties are 
worth noting. First,  π i (b) is increasing in  σ i and is independent of  σ j . The latter 
follows because only a low-type seller  j trades in the first period and therefore upon 
observing  z i = b , buyers know that  θ j = L regardless of how aggressively seller  j 
trades. On the other hand,  π i (g) is increasing in both  σ i and  σ j , since a more aggres-
sive trading strategy for seller  j implies a lower likelihood of  z i = g . Finally,  π i (g) 
is more sensitive to changes in  σ i than  σ j since seller  i ’s own trading strategy is 
always (weakly) more informative about her type than is seller  j ’s.
II. Equilibrium
From Lemmas 1 and 3 as well as the updating summarized by equations (4)–(6), 
an equilibrium can be characterized by the first-period trading intensity of the low 
type for each asset and the buyer mixing probabilities conditional on  π i (z) =  _ π. Let γ = {  σ A ,  σ B ,  ϕ A ,  ϕ B } denote an arbitrary candidate equilibrium. In this section, we 
derive the set of  γ that constitute equilibria and therefore the set of all PBE.
Let us briefly outline how we will proceed. We start by analyzing a benchmark 
with uncorrelated assets in which information spillovers are not present. We show 
that the equilibrium of this benchmark is unique and features a strictly positive prob-
ability of trade in the first period (Proposition 1). We then reintroduce correlation, 
but take the trading behavior for asset  j as given and analyze the “partial equilibrium” 
for asset  i . We show that, for each  ( σ j ,  ϕ j ) , there is a unique  ( σ i ,  ϕ i ) that is consistent 
with a partial equilibrium for asset  i , which may involve  σ i = 0 (Proposition 2). A 
full equilibrium of the model is then simply a fixed point, i.e.,  ( σ i ,  ϕ i ) is consistent 
with an equilibrium for asset  i given  ( σ j ,  ϕ j ) and vice versa. We argue that any fixed 
point must be symmetric and involves strictly positive probability of trade in the 
first period:  σ i =  σ j > 0 (Proposition 3). We then characterize the set of fixed 
points and show that multiple equilibria arise when information spillovers are suffi-
ciently strong (Theorem 1). Finally, we explore comparative statics with respect to 
the degree of asset correlation (Propositions 4 and 5).
A. Benchmark without Information Spillovers
In this section, we consider a benchmark in which information spillovers are 
absent because assets are uncorrelated (i.e.,  λ = 1 − π ). From equations (5) and 
13 We adopt the convention that  π i (b;  σ i , 0) =  lim  σ j →0   π i (b;  σ i ,  σ j ) . That is, buyers attribute an unexpected 
transaction to the low-type seller. This convention is without loss of generality. 
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(6), the buyers’ posterior belief  π i is equal to the interim belief  π  σ i  defined in equa-
tion (4). Thus, there are no strategic interactions, and, by symmetry, it suffices to 
consider the equilibrium of a model with a single asset. The continuation value of a 
type- θ seller  i as it depends on the equilibrium trading strategies  ( σ i ,  ϕ i ) is
(7)  Q θ i ( σ i ,  ϕ i ) = (1 − δ)  c θ + δ  F θ (  π  σ i  ,  ϕ i ), 
which is increasing in  σ i and increasing in  ϕ i whenever  π  σ i  =  _ π. For convenience, 
define  
_ σ > 0 such that  π  _ σ =  _ π. The following proposition characterizes the unique 
equilibrium of the benchmark.
PROPOSITION 1 (No Information Spillovers): If the assets are uncorrelated, 
then a unique equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium,  σ i =  _ σ and  ϕ i is such that 
 Q L i ( _ σ,  ϕ i ) =  v L .
Thus, when there are no information spillovers, there is a unique equilibrium with 
positive trade. We will next show how these results change when asset values are 
correlated.
B. Partial Equilibrium
We now reintroduce positive correlation. As mentioned above, we start by taking 
the behavior of agents with respect to asset  j as given and define a partial equilibrium 
as follows.
DEFINITION 1: We say that  ( σ i ,  ϕ i ) is a partial equilibrium for asset  i given  ( σ j ,  ϕ j ) if 
buyers’ beliefs about asset  i are updated according to (6) and the strategies induced 
by  ( σ i ,  ϕ i ) satisfy buyer and seller optimality for asset  i .14
Note that this definition does not require the behavior of seller  j to satisfy equilib-
rium conditions given  ( σ i ,  ϕ i ) , hence the “partial” moniker. To characterize partial 
equilibria, it will be useful to write the continuation value of a type- θ seller explic-
itly as it depends on the equilibrium strategies
(8)  Q θ i ( σ i ,  σ j ,  ϕ i ) ≡ (1 − δ)  c θ + δ  ∑ 
z∈{b, g}
  ρ θ i (z)  F θ ( π i (z),  ϕ i ). 
Notice that seller  i ’s expected continuation value is independent of  ϕ j , but it depends 
crucially on  σ j because seller  j ’s trading strategy determines the distribution of news 
and hence the distribution over  π i .
LEMMA 4: Fix an arbitrary  ( σ j ,  ϕ j ) ∈  [0, 1] 2 . Then  ( σ i ,  ϕ i ) ∈  [0, 1] 2 is a partial 
equilibrium for asset  i if and only if  Q L i ( σ i ,  σ j ,  ϕ i ) ≥  v L , where the inequality must 
hold with equality if  σ i > 0 .
14 For notational consistency we refer to a partial equilibrium as a pair  ( σ i ,  ϕ i ) ; however,  ϕ i is not required to 
characterize equilibrium behavior if the posterior is never equal to  
_ π. 
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To understand the necessity of the inequality, suppose that  Q L i <  v L . In this case, 
a low-type seller  i would strictly prefer to accept the bid in the first period and there-
fore seller optimality requires  σ i = 1 , which violates Lemma 3.
PROPOSITION 2 (Unique Partial Equilibrium): Fix an arbitrary  ( σ j ,  ϕ j ) ∈  [0, 1] 2 . 
There exists a unique  σ i consistent with a partial equilibrium for asset  i , which may 
involve  σ i = 0 , in which case seller  i simply “waits for news” (i.e., trades with 
probability zero).15
That a partial equilibrium may involve  σ i = 0 is similar to Daley and Green (2012), in which news is generated by an exogenous process. In their continu-
ous-time setting with exogenous news, it is in fact necessary that equilibria involve 
periods of no trade. In our setting, news is endogenously generated by trade of 
another asset, which, as we will see, eliminates the possibility of a period with no 
trade once we solve simultaneously for a “full” equilibrium of the model.
Before doing so, consider the effect of  σ j on  Q L i . As  σ j increases, there are two 
forces to consider. First, higher  σ j makes good news more valuable; conditional on 
good news, buyers’ posterior about asset  i is more favorable and hence the expected 
price is higher. Note that there is no analogous effect following bad news; condi-
tional on  z i = b , buyers know that  θ j = L but their belief about seller  i (and hence 
the expected price) is independent of  σ j . The second effect is that higher  σ j makes 
bad news more likely from the perspective of a low-type seller  i . These two forces 
push in opposite directions and either one can dominate. Hence,  Q L i may increase or 
decrease with  σ j . The upshot is that, as seller  j trades more aggressively, the partial 
equilibrium for asset  i will involve seller  i trading more or less aggressively if the 
bad or good news effect, respectively, dominates.
To illustrate these two effects graphically, we plot  Q L i as a function of  σ i for 
four different levels of  σ j in Figure 2, panel A. Notice that moving from  σ j = 0 
to  σ j = 0.3 , seller  i must trade less aggressively in order to maintain  Q L i =  v L . 
Further, when  σ j = 0.6 ,  Q L i lies above  v L everywhere and hence seller  i strictly pre-
fers to wait. Finally, for  σ j = 0.9 , the bad news effect dominates and seller  i must 
trade more aggressively to maintain indifference.
As we show below, in general, the good news effect dominates initially (i.e., for 
low  σ j ), while the bad news effect dominates eventually (i.e., for high  σ j ). To for-
malize this result, define the mapping from seller  j ’s trading strategy into the corre-
sponding partial equilibrium trading strategy of seller  i by  S( · ) , where  S( σ j ) = 0 
if  Q L i (0,  σ j , 0) ≥  v L and  S satisfies  Q L i (S( σ j ),  σ j ,  ϕ i ) =  v L for some  ϕ i ∈ [0, 1] 
otherwise. Figure 2, panel B, illustrates a plot of  S , which is characterized in the 
following lemma.
LEMMA 5 (Strategic Interactions): Suppose that both  δ and  λ are sufficiently large. 
Then there exist  σ 1 <  σ 2 ∈ (0, 1) such that:
 (i)  S is strictly decreasing on  [0,  σ 1 ] ;
15 Generically, the  ϕ i consistent with a partial equilibrium is also unique (see Proof of Proposition 2). 
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 (ii)  S(σ) = 0 for  σ ∈ [ σ 1 ,  σ 2 ] ;
 (iii)  S is increasing on  [ σ 2 , 1] .
To understand the intuition, suppose first that  σ j = 0 , in which case, just as 
in Proposition 1, the unique partial equilibrium involves  σ i =  _ σ such that buy-
ers’ interim belief following a rejection in the first period is  
_ π. Because there are 
no information spillovers from asset  j , buyers’ belief at  t = 2 is also  _ π. Hence, 
buyer mixing at  t = 2 is consistent with a partial equilibrium and  ϕ i is such that 
 Q L i ( _ σ, 0,  ϕ i ) =  v L .
Next, consider an arbitrarily small  σ j > 0 and suppose  σ i remains fixed at  _ σ. 
Then, with probability arbitrarily close to one, seller  j does not trade at  t = 1 , 
which is good news and leads to  π i (g) >  π  σ i  =  _ π. By Lemma 1, the bid at  t = 2 
must be  V( π i (g)) >  c H with probability arbitrarily close to one. Thus, the good 
news effect causes a discontinuous increase in  Q L i , whereas the bad news effect (with arbitrarily small probability, bad news arrives and the bid is  v L ) is continuous. 
Clearly the good news effect dominates and in order to restore  Q L i =  v L ,  σ i must 
decrease such that  π i (g) =  _ π. Hence  S is decreasing on  (0,  σ 1 ) , where  σ 1 is such 
that  π i (g, 0,  σ 1 ) =  _ π.
For  σ j ∈ ( σ 1 ,  σ 2 ) , seller  i gets a high enough price following good news and the 
likelihood of bad news remains small enough, that she strictly prefers to wait. That 
is,  Q L i >  v L for all  σ i (as in the dashed line in Figure 2, panel A), and therefore the 
partial equilibrium requires  σ i = 0 .
For  σ j ≥  σ 2 , the probability of bad news is sufficiently large that the low type 
would be strictly worse off by simply waiting. Hence, she resumes trading with 
strictly positive probability. In Figure 2, panel B, she does so at first (i.e., where  S is 
strictly increasing) in order to boost the price following good news while the price 
Figure 2. Partial Equilibria and Strategic Interactions
Notes: Panel A illustrates how the continuation value of a low-type seller  i depends on both  σ  i and  σ j . Panel B illus-
trates the set of partial equilibria for asset  i taking  σ  j as given. The four markers in the panel B correspond to the 
partial equilibria for the four different levels of  σ  j  plotted in panel A. Parameters used:  δ = 0.7 ,  λ = 0.9 . The fol-
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following bad news remains  v L , but eventually (i.e., where  S is flat) the probability 
of bad news is so large that she trades in order to induce  π i (b) =  _ π and her indiffer-
ence is sustained through the buyer mixing probability after bad news.16
It is worth noting that the non-monotonicity in  S obtains when asset correla-
tion is sufficiently large. When the correlation is low, the partial equilibrium 
involves  π i (g) =  _ π and the good news effect dominates for all  σ j (as in Figure 3, 
panel A). Moreover, as the correlation goes to zero,  S converges uniformly to  _ σ.
C. Full Equilibria
Moving from a partial equilibrium for asset  i to an equilibrium across both assets 
requires that the trading strategies also satisfy  σ j = S( σ i ) for  j ≠ i . That is, taken 
as given the offers for asset  i and the strategy of its seller, the offers for asset  j and 
the strategy of its seller must also correspond to a partial equilibrium. The follow-
ing result shows that all equilibria must be symmetric and involve strictly positive 
probability of trade.
PROPOSITION 3 (Symmetry and News): In any equilibrium,  σ A =  σ B > 0 . If 
buyer mixing is part of an equilibrium,  ϕ A =  ϕ B .
Though symmetry is not an obvious property, the proof is actually quite sim-
ple. If  σ i >  σ j ≥ 0 then  Q L i >  Q L j . But because  Q L j must be weakly bigger 
than  v L (Lemma 4), the low-type seller  i strictly prefers to wait, which contra-
dicts  σ i > 0 satisfying seller optimality. The strict inequality in Proposition 3 then 
follows immediately: if  σ A =  σ B = 0 , then no news arrives and buyers’ beliefs 
in the second period are exactly the same as in the first period, which would imply 
that  Q L A =  Q L B <  v L , again violating Lemma 4. Notice the contrast of this result 
16 Recall that  π i (b) is independent of  σ j , which explains why  S is flat in this region. 
Figure 3. Spillover Effects and Multiplicity 
Notes: This figure illustrates the set of equilibria for two different levels of correlation. In panel A, asset values are 
only weakly correlated, whereas in panel B asset values are highly correlated.
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to the partial equilibrium (i.e., with exogenous news). When news is endogenously 
generated, it cannot be an equilibrium for either seller to simply wait for news.
Having established that any equilibrium must be symmetric, we drop the sub-
scripts and denote an equilibrium by the pair  (σ, ϕ) . Furthermore, having established 
that any equilibrium involves  σ ∈ (0, 1) , the low type must be indifferent between 
accepting  v L in the first period and waiting until the second period. Hence, any pair 
is an equilibrium if and only if
(9)  Q L (σ, σ, ϕ) =  v L . 
We have thus narrowed the search for equilibria to the solutions to equation (9). 
It is useful to note that potential equilibria can be classified into three different 
types depending on the posterior beliefs. Since the posterior beliefs are monotonic 
in the amount of trade in the first period, it is convenient to introduce the following 
definition.
DEFINITION 2: We define the three possible types of equilibria as
•	 Low trade:  π i (g) =  _ π >  π i (b) ,
•	 Medium trade:  π i (g) >  _ π >  π i (b) , and
•	 High trade:  π i (g) >  _ π =  π i (b) .17
We denote the equilibrium trading intensity in the first period by  σ q where 
q ∈ {low, med, high} and  σ low <  σ med <  σ high . Note that in a low (high) trade 
equilibrium,  σ q is pinned down by  π i (g,  σ q ,  σ q ) =  _ π ( π i (b,  σ q ,  σ q ) =  _ π) and  ϕ q 
is the solution to (9) given  σ q . In a medium trade equilibrium, buyer mixing is not 
part of the equilibrium (hence ϕ is undetermined) and  σ must solve (9). Using these 
observations, we now establish the main result of the paper.
THEOREM 1 (Characterization and Multiplicity): An equilibrium exists and there 
are at most three. More precisely, equilibria are characterized as follows:
 (i) Low Trade.—There is at most one low trade equilibrium. There exists a _ δ < 1 , such that this equilibrium exists if  δ >  _ δ.
 (ii) High Trade.—There is at most one high trade equilibrium. Given  δ , there 
exist  
_ λδ < 1 such that this equilibrium exists if  λ >  _ λδ .
 (iii) Medium Trade.—There are at most two medium trade equilibria. Exactly one 
such equilibrium exists if  δ >  _ δ and  λ >  _ λδ .
The three types of equilibria coexist when  δ >  _ δ and  λ >  _ λδ . If correlation is 
sufficiently small, the equilibrium is generically unique and converges to the one in 
Proposition 1 as correlation goes to zero.
17 The other two possible orderings of the posteriors  π i (g) >  π i (b) >  _ π and  _ π >  π i (g) >  π i (b) are ruled 
out by Lemma 1 and Assumption 2, respectively. 
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The key insights of the theorem are illustrated in Figure 3, which considers two 
different levels of correlation. In panel B, correlation is relatively high, leading to 
strong spillover effects and three equilibria.18 In panel A, correlation is relatively 
low. Hence, the spillover effects are modest, which leads to a unique equilibrium 
with low trade.
D. The Effects of Asset Correlation
As we have just seen, asset correlation can lead to information spillovers and 
generate multiplicity. The level of correlation also has important implications for 
trading volume and welfare, which we now elaborate upon.
PROPOSITION 4 (Trading Volume): First-period trading volume increases with  λ 
in the high trade equilibrium, decreases with  λ in the low trade equilibrium, and can 
decrease with  λ in the medium trade equilibria.
Figure 4, panel A illustrates the effects of correlation on trading volume. Holding 
σ fixed, increasing  λ makes bad news more likely from the low type’s perspec-
tive (akin to the bad news effect) but increases the posterior belief following good 
news (akin to the good news effect). In the low trade equilibrium,  π i (g) =  _ π, 
hence  σ i must decrease to offset the good news effect. In the high trade equilibrium, 
 π i (b) =  _ π, and since an increase in  λ leads to a lower belief following bad news,  σ i 
must increase. In the medium trade equilibrium, both the good and bad news effects 
are at play in determining first-period trading volume. As in Figure 4, panel A, our 
numerical examples suggest that the good news effect dominates in the medium 
trade equilibrium and thus  σ decreases with  λ , though we do not have a general 
proof of this result.
To understand the welfare implications, observe that because buyers are identical 
and competitive, they extract zero (expected) surplus. Next, recall that in any equi-
librium the low-type sellers are indifferent between trading in the first period at a 
price of  v L or waiting and trading in the second period. Hence, their ex ante equilib-
rium payoff is  v L regardless of equilibrium or level of asset correlation. In order to 
study the welfare implications, it is therefore sufficient to consider the equilibrium 
payoff of a high-type seller, which we denote by  Q H q , where  q ∈ {low, med, high} 
denotes the equilibrium. Moreover, any welfare improvement for the high-type 
seller is a Pareto improvement.
PROPOSITION 5 (Welfare): The following statements hold:
 (i) Whenever the three equilibria coexist, the high trade equilibrium Pareto 
dominates the medium trade equilibrium, which Pareto dominates the low 
trade equilibrium (i.e.,  Q H high >  Q H med >  Q H low ).
18 Belief-based refinements (e.g., Intuitive Criterion or Divinity) do not eliminate any of the equilibria since 
there are no off-path events. However, it is worth noting that the medium trade equilibrium is less “stable” than 
the other two equilibria in the following sense. When all three equilibria coexist, the function  S( σ j ) crosses the 
45-degree line from below at  σ med (see Figure 3, panel B). Thus, if players started from a conjecture that  σ j was just 
above or below  σ med , the partial equilibrium for asset  i would be even further away from  σ med . 
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 (ii)  Q H high increases with  λ ,  Q H med can decrease with  λ , and  Q H low =  c H for all  λ .
The first part of the proposition offers a welfare ranking across equilibria. In the low 
trade equilibrium, following both good and bad news, the high-type seller’s equi-
librium payoff is  c H . In both the medium and high trade equilibria, after good news 
the buyers’ beliefs satisfy  π i (g) >  _ π. Hence, after good news the price offered is 
strictly above  c H and after bad news the high type is no worse off. This immediately 
implies that in both of these equilibria, the high-type seller is strictly better off than 
in the low trade equilibrium. In fact, the high-type seller’s payoff is strictly increas-
ing in  σ for all  σ ≥  σ low : more aggressive trading by the low type in the first period 
leads to less adverse selection, higher prices and more trade in the second period. 
Therefore, the high trade equilibrium Pareto dominates the medium trade one.
Holding  σ q fixed,  Q H q increases with  λ . Thus, it is natural to conjecture that welfare 
improves with the level of correlation. However, the second part of the proposition 
shows that the welfare comparatives statics are considerably more nuanced. In par-
ticular,  σ low decreases with  λ at a rate that precisely offsets any welfare gains so that 
welfare remains independent of the degree of correlation in the low trade equilib-
rium. Further,  σ med can decrease sufficiently fast that welfare is actually decreasing 
in  λ in the medium trade equilibrium. On the other hand,  σ high increases with  λ such 
that the gains of increasing correlation are amplified in the high trade equilibrium.
Figure 4, panel B, offers a graphical illustration of Proposition 5. When cor-
relation is low, there is a unique equilibrium, which involves low trade. In this 
equilibrium, the high type is indifferent whether to trade or not following good 
news and any increase in correlation results in a decrease in  σ keeping total wel-
fare unchanged. When correlation becomes sufficiently large, information spillovers 
become relevant and multiplicity kicks in. Higher correlation reduces welfare along 
the medium trade equilibrium because  σ med decreases sufficiently fast (see Figure 4, 
panel A), which leads to less efficient trade in the first period and more adverse 
selection in the second period. On the other hand, in the high trade equilibrium, the 
Figure 4. The Effect of Correlation
Notes: Panel A illustrates the set of equilibrium  σ as they depend on the level of correlation and the dotted black 
line is the unique equilibrium  σ when asset values are uncorrelated. Panel B illustrates welfare as it depends on the 
level of correlation.
0.4 0.6 0.8 1
λ-level of correlation




























2025AsriyAn et Al.: informAtion spillovers in Asset mArkets vol. 107 no. 7
low types trade more aggressively as correlation increases, leading to less adverse 
selection in the second period and higher welfare.
III. Post-Trade Transparency in Opaque Markets
The extent to which information spillovers can impact market behavior depends 
crucially on the ability of agents to observe previous transactions. Up to this point, 
we have assumed that all trades take place in one market and that all potential buy-
ers observe all previous transactions. In practice, trades often take place with less 
transparency. Not all participants observe all assets for sale nor do they necessarily 
have access to a database of prior transactions.
The corporate bond market prior to the introduction of TRACE is a good example 
of such a setting. Bessembinder and Maxwell (2008) describe the pre-TRACE cor-
porate bond market as an “opaque environment” in which completed transactions 
“were not made public.” Beginning in July 2002, regulators required bond dealers 
to report all trades in publicly issued corporate bonds to the National Association of 
Security Dealers, which in turn made transaction data available to the public.
Changes in the degree of transparency can also materialize through market-based 
mechanisms. For instance, as discussed earlier, recent innovations in information 
technologies and the introduction of websites such as Zillow, RedFin, and Trulia 
have greatly increased the post-trade transparency in real estate markets.
In this section, we use our framework to explore the implications of introduc-
ing post-trade transparency into an otherwise opaque market. To do so, we mod-
ify the model slightly so that not all buyers necessarily observe all transactions. 
Specifically, we assume that each asset trades on a different “platform” and potential 
buyers only observe transactions on the platform in which they participate. We will 
first analyze the case in which buyers are symmetric: each buyer participates on 
only one platform. Buyers on platform  i observe transactions of asset  i but not asset 
j and vice versa for buyers on platform  j . We then extend our analysis to a setting 
in which one buyer participates on both platforms and has superior information to 
other potential buyers.
A. Symmetric Buyers
Absent post-trade transparency, buyers on platform  i do not know whether asset 
j sold. In this case, we say the market is opaque. In an opaque market, information 
spillovers are not possible and, regardless of the true underlying correlation, the 
equilibrium looks as if asset values are uncorrelated (Proposition 1).
In the presence of post-trade transparency, a transaction in the first period 
becomes public information across all buyers in the second period and the set of 
equilibria depend on the level of correlation as in Theorem 1. Thus, post-trade 
transparency facilitates information spillovers in markets that are otherwise opaque, 
which can lead to multiple equilibria and have consequences for both trade volume 
and welfare.
PROPOSITION 6 (Effect of Post-Trade Transparency): If the market is opaque 
then, regardless of  λ , there are no information spillovers and a unique equilibrium 
2026 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW july 2017
exists (as in Proposition 1). Suppose that  δ >  _ δ as in Theorem 1; then introducing 
post-trade transparency has the following implications:
 (i) Multiple equilibria will exist if  λ is sufficiently high. Depending on which 
equilibrium is played, trade volume may increase or decrease while welfare 
weakly increases.
 (ii) The equilibrium remains unique if  λ is not sufficiently high. Trade volume 
will decrease while welfare remains unchanged.
Indeed, there is mixed empirical evidence as to the effects of TRACE. Asquith, 
Covert, and Pathak (2013) find that it led to a significant decline in trading activ-
ity for high-yield bonds. This is in contrast to a controlled study by Goldstein, 
Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007), who find no conclusive evidence that TRACE caused a 
reduction in trading activity. Proposition 6 helps to reconcile these findings: intro-
ducing post-trade transparency can increase or decrease trading activity depending 
on the correlation and which equilibrium is played.
In the online Appendix, we extend our results to intermediate levels of post-trade 
transparency. In particular, we posit that buyers on platform  i observe a transac-
tion on platform  j with some intermediate probability  ξ ∈ (0, 1) . Fixing  δ >  _ δ
and  λ >  _ λδ as in Theorem 1, we show that there exists a critical level of post-
trade transparency  
_ ξ ∈ (0, 1) such that the three equilibria in Definition 2 coexist if 
 ξ >  _ ξ. Whereas the equilibrium is unique when the level of post-trade transparency 
(as measured by  ξ ) is sufficiently small.
We then analyze the welfare implications in more detail by conducting compar-
ative statics on  ξ . Some post-trade transparency ( ξ > 0 ) always weakly increases 
welfare relative to an opaque market ( ξ = 0 ). Moreover, both volume and welfare 
are increasing in  ξ in the high trade equilibrium. However, starting from  ξ ∈ (0, 1) , 
increasing post-trade transparency is not guaranteed to improve the outcome. For 
instance, as  ξ increases, both volume and welfare decrease in the medium trade 
equilibrium. In the low trade equilibrium, volume decreases with  ξ while welfare 
remains unchanged. These results further emphasize the insight that publishing data 
about trading activity can alter its information content and potentially lead to worse 
outcomes.
B. Asymmetric Buyers
Pro-transparency policies are sometimes motivated as a way to “level the playing 
field” between traders with different levels of access to information. In this section, 
we evaluate the effects of such policies in a setting where one buyer has better 
access to transaction data than others. For example, broker-dealers are active in 
many markets, which gives them an informational advantage over investors who 
participate less frequently or in fewer markets.
To capture this feature, we now assume that one of the buyers is active on both 
trading platforms and is therefore able to observe the history of transactions of 
both assets regardless of whether there is post-trade transparency. For convenience, 
we refer to this buyer as an insider. The remaining buyers, whom we refer to as 
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 investors, participate on either platform  i or  j , but not both.19 In this section, we will 
also assume that in each period the seller holds a second price auction with a secret 
reserve price. Adopting this trading mechanism (rather than Bertrand competition) 
is primarily to simplify the equilibrium analysis and intuition.20
Remark 2: When post-trade transparency is in place, investors have the same 
information as the insider and the set of equilibrium is the same as in Theorem 1. 
Therefore, both investors and the insider make zero (expected) trading profits.
When the market is opaque, investors’ degree of sophistication is an important 
determinant of whether they benefit from a policy inducing post-trade transparency. 
Below, we consider two different specifications regarding the degree of sophistica-
tion of investors. They can be either “naïve” or “sophisticated” regarding the fact that 
they are facing competition from a trader with access to better information. One can 
think of naïve investors as utility maximizing agents with an incorrect prior belief 
about the probability that an insider is present (i.e., the true probability is one but 
naïve investors believe it is zero). Sophisticated investors are fully rational agents.
Regardless of investors’ sophistication, several familiar features arise in equilib-
rium. The bid in the first period is  v L . The first period bid is rejected by the high-type 
seller with probability one and accepted by the low-type seller with probability  σ i . 
We characterize equilibrium behavior in the second period separately for each case 
(naïve/sophisticated investors) below.
Naïve Investors.—If the market is opaque then, in the second period, naïve inves-
tors bid according to Lemma 1, where their posteriors are conditioned only on  σ i . 
The insider bids the unconditional expected value if her posterior is above  
_ π and  v L 
otherwise. Naïve investors fall prey to a winner’s curse. They win the auction only 
when the insider receives bad news from the other platform. Conditional on asset 
j trading in the first period, naïve investors’ bid underestimates the probability of 
asset  i being low value and hence, on average, they experience trading losses. On 
the other hand, when asset  j does not trade, then naïve investors are always outbid 
by the insider who is thus able to capture information rents. Also, since the second 
highest bid always originates from investors, the seller faces exactly the distribution 
of bids as if he were facing only naïve investors. This implies that any rents made by 
the insider are exactly offset by the losses of the investors. Thus, in addition to the 
potential for multiple equilibria and welfare gains for the seller, post-trade transpar-
ency has a redistributive effect from the insider to the naïve investors.
PROPOSITION 7 (Naïve Investors): If investors are naïve and the market is opaque, 
there exists a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium generates the same total surplus 
19 Our results extend to the case in which an insider is present with probability  ϵ ∈ (0, 1) . The results can also 
be extended to a setting with multiple insiders as long as they are able to capture some information rents (e.g., 
the insiders are not identically informed). If multiple insiders compete away all information rents, the analysis of 
Section III applies. 
20 When buyers are symmetric (or there is public reporting), both trading mechanisms lead to exactly the same 
equilibrium outcomes. In an opaque market with asymmetric buyers and Bertrand competition, the equilibrium 
construction is more complex because the optimal bidding strategy depends on the distribution of other bids, which 
can require that buyers mix over a continuum of offers. Nevertheless, the key insights in Propositions 7 and 8 are 
robust to Bertrand competition (formal results available upon request). 
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as the low trade equilibrium in Theorem 1. However, the insider makes positive 
trading profits while naïve investors experience trading losses. Therefore, introduc-
ing post-trade transparency reduces insider trading profits and increases the wel-
fare of naïve investors.
Sophisticated Investors.—When investors understand that they are competing 
against an insider, they are aware of the winner’s curse. Therefore, when the market 
is opaque, sophisticated investors bid in the second period as if the asset on the other 
platform traded in the first period. Note that a bid of  v L w.p.1 in the second period 
cannot be part of an equilibrium. Therefore, it must be that  π i (b) =  _ π, which 
requires a higher equilibrium  σ than if all buyers are symmetric.21 The increased 
probability of trade in the first period enhances efficiency relative to the symmetric 
buyer case. Yet, all the additional surplus goes to the insider and not the seller who 
still faces the same distribution of offers in the second period. On the other hand, 
with post-trade transparency, the insider faces competition from sophisticated inves-
tors and thus loses his rents. Unlike with naïve buyers, the reduction in the insider’s 
rents is not purely redistributive.
PROPOSITION 8 (Sophisticated Investors): When investors are sophisticated and 
the market is opaque, there exists a unique equilibrium that Pareto dominates the low 
trade equilibrium in Theorem 1. The additional surplus is captured entirely by the 
insider. Therefore, introducing post-trade transparency reduces insider profits without 
affecting sophisticated investors’ welfare but may decrease overall trading surplus.
Importantly, in both cases, insiders prefer opacity. This may help explain why 
insiders in financial markets lobbied against rapid dissemination of transaction data 
to all market participants.22 In addition, our results show that although post-trade 
transparency can help protect naïve investors, there is a risk of reducing welfare if 
applied in an environment where investors are sophisticated.
It is worth noting the contrast to the case with symmetric buyers, in which post-
trade transparency cannot lead to lower welfare. The difference in the results stems 
from the fact that when there is an insider who is better informed, there is effectively 
less competition in the second period. This makes the seller more pessimistic about 
the future and thus increases her willingness to trade early. Thereby, opacity has the 
potential to mitigate the seller’s incentive to delay trade and increase welfare pro-
vided that investors are sophisticated.
IV. Concluding Remarks
We study the effects of information spillovers in a setting where asset values are 
correlated and sellers have private information. We highlight novel feedback effects 
21 Here,  π i (b) can be interpreted either as the belief of the insider conditional on observing a trade of asset  j or 
the belief of investors on platform  i reasoning about asset  i as if asset  j traded. 
22 In a letter to the SEC, the Bond Market Association, which represents bond dealers and underwriters, stated 
that its membership had “serious concerns about potential harm to liquidity resulting from rapid dissemination of 
transaction data on lower rated, less frequently traded issues.” Note that these are precisely the bonds where infor-
mation asymmetries are likely to be most relevant  (see www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=779).
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between the information content in markets and the incentive to trade in a dynamic 
setting. The endogenous nature of information introduces strategic interactions in 
the trading behavior of sellers. When correlation is sufficiently high, we show that 
these interactions lead to multiple equilibria that differ in their trading volume, 
prices, information content, and welfare.
Information spillovers require that transactions be observable to market partici-
pants. When markets are opaque, the equilibrium is unique. Hence, introducing post-
trade transparency can lead to multiplicity, which can increase or decrease trading 
activity depending on the level of correlation and which equilibrium is played. This 
finding has implications for how we interpret empirical work. For instance, it can 
help explain why Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) and Edwards, 
Harris, and Piwowar (2007) find that market participants gain from the introduction 
of TRACE, while Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) see no effect within a sub-
class of securities, and Asquith, Covert, and Pathak (2013) find significantly differ-
ent results for bonds that were part of the different phases of the TRACE program.
Our findings are also relevant from a policy perspective. In order to achieve 
potential welfare gains associated with post-trade transparency, it is important to 
steer market participants to coordinate on the correct equilibrium. When market par-
ticipants have differential access to transaction data, post-trade transparency indeed 
“levels the playing field” if investors are naïve; it reduces both insiders’ trading 
profits and investors’ trading losses. However, post-trade transparency does not ben-
efit sophisticated investors and can potentially reduce total surplus. Therefore, it is 
important to take into account the type of market participants when considering such 
policies.
Another relevant pro-transparency policy is the introduction of published bench-
marks (e.g., LIBOR). Duffie, Dworczak, and Zhu (forthcoming) analyze the role 
of benchmarks in revealing information about fundamentals. Their paper suggests 
that the introduction of benchmarks is welfare enhancing. In our setting, the history 
of transactions can also reveal information about fundamentals. Our analysis high-
lights an important consideration absent in their setting, which is that the informa-
tional content of the benchmark may change once it is published. Due to feedback 
effects, publishing benchmarks may reveal more or less information than expected 
and can have additional consequences for trading behavior. Thus, when considering 
an introduction of a benchmark, it is important to understand the extent to which its 
information content is endogenous.
Appendix
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: 
For (i) and (ii), see the proof of Lemma 1 in Daley and Green (2016).23 Moreover, 
by their Lemma A.3, the bid price must earn zero expected profit. To demonstrate 
(iii), we will show that the bid price must be either  v L or  c H when  π i =  _ π by ruling 
out all other bids.
23 Conditional on reaching the second trading period and the buyer’s belief,  π i , the strategic setting for a single 
asset  i is identical to theirs. 
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Clearly, at  t = 2 , the reservation price of the low-type seller is  c L and the reser-
vation price of the high-type seller is  c H . Hence, if the bid is strictly above  c H , both 
types will accept w.p.1 and the winning buyer earns negative expected profit. Next, 
suppose there is positive probability that the bid is strictly less than  v L . Then, for ϵ > 0 small enough, a buyer could earn strictly positive expected profit by deviat-
ing and offering  v L − ϵ . Finally, if the bid is strictly between  v L and  c H , the high type 
will reject, the low type will accept, and the winning buyer makes negative profit. 
Thus, we have shown that the equilibrium bid price at  t = 2 when  π i =  _ π must be 
either  v L or  c H . ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: 
Since  c H >  c L and  F H ≥  F L , we have that
  Q L i =  (1 − δ) ·  c L + δ ·  E L { F L ( π i ,  ϕ i )} ≤  (1 − δ) ·  c H + δ ·  E L {  F H (  π i ,  ϕ i )}. 
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that  E H {  F H (  π i ,  ϕ i )} ≥  E L {  F H (  π i ,  ϕ i )} . Recall 
that  F H is increasing in  π i and independent of  ϕ i . Hence, the desired inequality is 
implied by proving that conditional on  θ i = H , the random variable  π i (weakly) 
first-order stochastically dominates  π i conditional on  θ i = L .
Note that the distribution of  π i in the second period is a function of the trad-
ing probabilities by both types and the realization of news from the other seller, 
 z i ∈ {trade, no trade} . For  θ ∈ {L, H} and  z ∈ {trade, no trade} , define  ρ θ (z) ≡ Pr (  z i = z |  θ i = θ) . Fix the interim belief  π i Int , and for  z′, z″ ∈ {trade, no trade} 
with  z′ ≠ z″ , say that  z i = z′ is “good news” if the  posterior  π i satis-
fies  π i (z′ ) ≥  π i (z″ ) , and it is “bad news” otherwise. Without loss of generality, 
suppose that  z ′ is good news and  z″ is bad news. But note that this implies
     
 π i Int ·  ρ H (z′ )_______________________  π i Int ·  ρ H (z′ ) + (1 −  π i Int ) ·  ρ L (z′ ) =  π i (z′ ) ≥  π i (z″ ) 
 =   π i Int ·  ρ H (z″ )__________________________  π i Int ·  ρ H (z″ ) + (1 −  π i Int ) ·  ρ L (z″ )
with  π i (z) ≡  π i Int if  ρ H (z) =  ρ L (z) = 0 . Combining with the fact that 
 ρ θ (z″ ) = 1 −  ρ θ (z′ ) for  θ = L, H , we have that  ρ H (z′ ) ≥  ρ L (z′ ) , which estab-
lishes the result. ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 3:
  (i) From Lemma 2 , the strict ranking of seller continuation values implies that, 
in any equilibrium, if the high type is willing to accept an offer with positive 
probability then the low type must accept w.p.1. Thus, given Assumption 1, 
any bid at or above  c H would lead to negative expected profit. Any bid in ( v L ,  c H ) also leads to losses since it is only accepted by the low type. If the bid 
was strictly less than  v L , a buyer can make strictly positive profits by offer-
ing  v L − ϵ , for  ϵ > 0 small enough. Thus, any deterministic offer strictly 
below  v L can be ruled out. The only deterministic bid possible is  v L , at this 
2031AsriyAn et Al.: informAtion spillovers in Asset mArkets vol. 107 no. 7
point there is no profitable deviation for the other buyer than offering  v L as 
well. The same arguments rule out any mixed strategy equilibrium that has a 
mass point anywhere other than  v L . Finally, mixing continuously over some 
interval of offers cannot be an equilibrium. We show this by contradiction. If 
one of the buyers mixes over some interval  [ b _,  _ b ] with  _ b =  v L then the other 
buyer must be offering  v L with probability  1 because otherwise he would 
never want to offer  v L , which leads to zero profits  w.p.1 . If instead  _ b <  v L , 
the other buyer’s best response can never have  b _ (or anything below) as part 
of its support. This bid will lose with probability  1 and thus earn zero profits, 
while bidding  
 _ b +  v L  ____2 would lead to strictly positive profits.
  (ii) Clearly the high type would reject  v L , since  v L <  c H . To see that the low type 
must accept with probability less than one, note that if in equilibrium the low 
type accepted w.p.1, then the posterior belief would assign probability 1 to the 
type being high in the next period. The offer in the second period (as argued 
in Lemma 1) would then be  v H but, given Assumption 2 , the low-type seller 
prefers to deviate and trade in period 2 at  v H rather than trade at  v L in period 1. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: 
Let  
_ σ be defined by  π  σ i  =  _ π, which is unique and by Assumption  1 satisfies 
 
_ σ ∈ (0, 1) . Suppose an equilibrium exists and has  σ i <  _ σ (if and only if 
 π  σ i  <  _ π). Then by Lemma  1 we have  Q L i = (1 − δ)  c L + δ  v L <  v L , which 
contradicts  σ i < 1 . Suppose instead that an equilibrium exists and 
has  σ i >  _ σ (if and only if  π  σ i  >  _ π). Then by Lemma 1 and Assumption  2 we 
have  Q L i = (1 − δ)  c L + δV(  π  σ i  ) > (1 − δ)  c L + δ  c H >  v L , which contradicts 
 σ i > 0 . Hence, in any equilibrium,  σ i =  _ σ (if and only if  π  σ i  =  _ π), and the 
low type must be indifferent between trade at  t = 1 and trade at  t = 2 , i.e., 
 v L =  Q L i ( _ σ,  ϕ i ) . But note that  Q L i ( _ σ, · ) is monotonically increasing and continuous, 
with  Q L i ( _ σ, 0) = (1 − δ)  c L + δ  v L <  v L and  Q L i ( _ σ, 1) = (1 − δ)  c L + δ  c H >  v L , 
which implies that  ϕ i ∈ (0, 1) and that an equilibrium exists, is unique, with strate-
gies  ( σ i ,  ϕ i ) satisfying the stated conditions. ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 4: 
See text for the proof of necessity. Sufficiency follows from Lemmas 1–3. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
Fix any  ( σ j ,  ϕ j ) ∈  [0, 1] 2 . We separate the analysis into two cases depending 
on whether  Q L i(0,  σ j , 1) is greater than  v L . First, suppose that  Q L i(0,  σ j , 1) ≥  v L , 
then  σ i = 0 satisfies the partial equilibrium as established in Lemma 4. Moreover, 
we claim that any  σ i > 0 cannot be part of a partial equilibrium. To see why, 
note that  Q L i(0,  σ j , 1) ≥  v L implies that  π i (g) ≥  _ π for any  σ i > 0 . In this 
region,  Q L i( σ i ,  σ j , 1) is strictly increasing in  σ i , which means that  Q L i( σ i ,  σ j , 1) >  v L 
for all  σ i > 0 , violating Lemma 4. Hence, there is no other candidate value for  σ i 
satisfying the partial equilibrium as established in Lemma 4. Note that in this case 
the posteriors are generically not equal to  
_ π; thus buyer mixing is not part of a partial 
equilibrium and  ϕ i is not required to characterize equilibrium behavior.
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Next, suppose that  Q L i(0,  σ j , 1) <  v L , and note that  Q L i(1,  σ j ,  ϕ i ) >  v L for any 
 ϕ i ∈ [0, 1] by Assumption 2. Since  Q L i( σ i ,  σ j , · ) is upper hemicontinuous in  σ i , 
there exists a unique  σ i > 0 such that  Q L i( σ i ,  σ j ,  ϕ i ) =  v L for some  ϕ i ∈ [0, 1] . 
Furthermore, such a  σ i is unique since  Q L i is strictly increasing in  σ i when 
 π i (g) ≥  _ π, which is the only relevant region. The uniqueness of  ϕ i follows from 
the fact that  Q L i is strictly increasing in  ϕ i when buyer mixing is part of the partial 
equilibrium. ∎
The following technical result will be used in several subsequent proofs.
LEMMA A.1: For a given  σ i ,  (i)  Q L i( σ i ,  σ j , 1) is strictly decreasing in  σ j when-
ever  π i (b) <  _ π ≤  π i (g) , and  (ii)  Q H i ( σ i ,  σ j , · ) is strictly increasing in  σ j when-
ever  π i (b) ≤  _ π ≤  π i (g) .
PROOF: 
For  (i) , when posteriors satisfy  π i (b) <  _ π ≤  π i (g) , we have
  Q L i( σ i ,  σ j , 1) =  (1 − δ)  c L + δ ( ρ L i (b)  v L +  (1 −  ρ L i (b) ) V ( π i (g) ) ) . 
We can rewrite this expression as
   δ −1 ( Q L i( σ i ,  σ j , 1) −  (1 − δ)  c L ) =  ρ unc i (b) V ( π i (b) ) +  (1 −  ρ unc i (b) ) V ( π i (g) )  
unconditional expected value
 
+  ( ρ L i (b) −  ρ unc i (b) )  +
 (V ( π i (b) ) − V ( π i (g) ) )  − +  ρ L 
i (b)  ( v L − V ( π i (b) ) )  − , 
where  ρ unc i (b) =  σ j (1 − π) is the unconditional probability of bad news. The 
first term on the RHS is the unconditional expected value of the asset in  t = 2 , 
which is independent of  σ j by the law of iterated expectations. The second term 
is a correction for the fact that expectations are conditional on the seller being a 
low type; this term is negative and increases in magnitude as  σ j increases because 
 ρ L i (b) −  ρ unc i (b) and  V ( π i (g) ) − V ( π i (b) ) are increasing in  σ j . The last term is a 
correction for the fact that the bid following bad news is  v L and not the pooling 
price  V ( π i (b) ) ; this term is also negative and increases in magnitude as  σ j increases 
because  π i (b) is independent of  σ j while  ρ L i (b) increases in  σ j . This establishes  (i) .
For  (ii) , when posteriors satisfy  π i (b) ≤  _ π ≤  π i (g) , we have
  Q H i ( σ i ,  σ j , · ) =  (1 − δ)  c H + δ ( ρ H i (b)  c H +  (1 −  ρ H i (b) ) V ( π i (g) ) ) . 
We can re-write this expression as
  δ −1 ( Q H i ( σ i ,  σ j , · ) −  (1 − δ)  c H ) =  ρ unc i (b) V ( π i (b) ) +  (1 −  ρ unc i (b) ) V ( π i (g) )  
unconditional expected value
 
+  ( ρ H i (b) −  ρ unc i (b) )  −
  (V ( π i (b) ) − V ( π i (g) ) )  − +  ρ H 
i (b)  ( c H − V ( π i (b) ) )  +
 . 
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The first term on the RHS is the unconditional expected value of the asset in  t = 2 , 
which is independent of  σ j by the law of iterated expectations. The second term 
is a correction for the fact that expectations are conditional on the seller being a 
high type; this term is positive and increases with  σ j because  ρ unc i (b) −  ρ H i (b) 
and  V ( π i (g) ) − V ( π i (b) ) are increasing in  σ j . The last term is a correction for the 
fact that the high type’s payoff following bad news is  c H and not the pooling price 
 V ( π i (b) ) ; this term is also positive and increases with  σ j because  π i (b) is independent 
of  σ j while  ρ H i (b) increases in  σ j . This establishes  (ii) . ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 5: 
Before proceeding with the proof, we introduce several definitions and make 
three observations. First, define  σ 1 by
  π i (g; 0,  σ 1 ) =  _ π, 
and observe that  σ 1 ∈ (0, 1) if and only if  λ >  λ 1 ≡ 1 − π ·  1 −  
_ π ____1 − π ∈ (1 − π, 1) . 
Second, consider  δ 1, λ < 1 defined by
  v L =  (1 −  δ 1, λ )  c L +  δ 1, λ [λ  σ 1  v L +  (1 − λ  σ 1 )  c H ] , 
where the right-hand side is equal to  Q L i(0,  σ 1 , 1) when  δ =  δ 1, λ . Note that 
 Q L i(0,  σ 1 , 1) >  v L if  δ >  δ 1 ≡  sup λ∈(1−π, 1)   δ 1, λ ∈ (0, 1) . Third, there exists 
 λ 2 ∈ (1 − π, 1) such that  Q L i (0, 1, 1) <  v L for  λ >  λ 2 . This follows by con-
tinuity of  Q L i (0, 1, 1) in  λ and the fact that  lim λ→1   Q L i (0, 1, 1) =  (1 − δ)  c L + δ  v L <  v L . In what follows, we assume that  λ and  δ are sufficiently large meaning 
that  λ > max {  λ 1 ,  λ 2 } and  δ >  δ 1 .
For  (i) , it suffices to show that if  σ j <  σ 1 the partial equilibrium for asset  i must 
feature  π i (g) =  _ π. Suppose not. Then it must be that  π i (g) >  _ π, which means that 
the bid in the second period is above  c H following good news. Hence,
  Q L i >  (1 − δ)  c L + δ (λ  σ j  v L +  (1 − λ  σ j )  c H ) >  Q L i(0,  σ 1 , 1) >  v L . 
But if  Q L i >  v L then the optimal strategy for the low type is  σ i = 0 , which vio-
lates  π i (g) >  _ π.
For  (ii) , we claim there exists  σ 2 ∈ ( σ 1 , 1) such that  Q L i(0,  σ 2 , 1) =  v L and 
 Q L i(0,  σ j , 1) ≥  v L for  σ j ∈ [ σ 1 ,  σ 2 ] . Existence follows by continuity of  Q L i(0,  σ j , 1) 
in  σ j for  σ j ≥  σ 1 and our third observation (i.e., that  Q L i (0, 1, 1) <  v L ), while 
uniqueness follows from the fact that  Q L i(0,  σ j , 1) is decreasing in  σ j for  σ j ≥  σ 1 (see Lemma A.1  (i) ). Note that  S( σ j ) must be zero on  [ σ 1 ,  σ 2 ] .
For  (iii) , note that from our previous argument  Q L i (0,  σ 2 , 1) =  v L and 
 π i (g; 0,  σ 2 ) >  _ π >  π i (b; 0,  σ 2 ) since  σ 2 >  σ 1 . Since  π i (b;  σ i ,  σ j ) is continuous 
in  σ i and independent of  σ j and because  Q L i (  σ i ,  σ j , 1) is decreasing in  σ j when 
 π i (b) <  _ π ≤  π i (g) (see Lemma A.1  (i) ), there exists  σ 3 ∈ (  σ 2 , 1] such that the 
 S(  σ j ) required to maintain  Q L i (S( σ j ),  σ j , 1) =  v L is strictly increasing on 
 σ j ∈ [  σ 2 ,  σ 3 ] and satisfies  π i (b; S( σ j ),  σ j ) ≤  _ π. If  σ 3 = 1 , then  S is strictly increas-
ing on  [  σ 2 , 1] . But if  σ 3 < 1 then  π i (b; S( σ 3 ),  σ 3 ) =  _ π and  Q L i ( σ 3 ,  σ 3 , 0) =  v L , 
and for  σ j >  σ 3 we have  Q L i ( σ 3 ,  σ j , 0) <  v L by an argument analogous to that 
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in proof of Lemma A.1(i). Since  Q L i is increasing in  σ i ,  S( σ j ) cannot be lower than 
S( σ 3 ) . Hence,  S is nondecreasing on  [  σ 3 , 1] . ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
The proof that all equilibria involve strictly positive probability of trade at  t = 1 
is in the text. We show here that all equilibria must be symmetric. In search of a 
contradiction, assume there exists an equilibrium in which  σ A >  σ B ≥ 0 . Then 
notice the following:
 (i) The probability of bad news for seller  B is higher than that of bad news for 
seller  A .
 (ii) Conditional on bad news, beliefs must satisfy  π A (b) >  π B (b) since
  π i (b) =  1  _____________________   
1 +  Pr ( θ j = L |  θ i = L)  _____________
Pr ( θ j = L |  θ i = H) ·  
1 −  π  σ i   ____ π  σ i   
  is increasing in  σ i and is independent of  σ j .
 (iii) Conditional on good news, beliefs must satisfy  π A (g) >  π B (g) since
  π i (g) =  1  __________________________  
1 +  1 −  σ j · Pr ( θ j = L |  θ i = L) __________________  
1 −  σ j · Pr ( θ j = L |  θ i = H) ·  
1 −  π  σ i   ____ π  σ i   
  is more sensitive to own trading probability  σ i than to  σ j due to imperfect 
correlation.
Note that (i)–(iii) imply that  Q L A >  Q L B . Moreover, if  σ A ∈  (0, 1) , it must be 
that  Q L A =  v L (by Lemma 4), which then implies that  Q L B <  v L . This contradicts 
a necessary condition for a partial equilibrium for asset  B (also by Lemma 4). The 
symmetry in ϕ follows from monotonicity of  Q L i in  ϕ i whenever buyer mixing is part 
of an equilibrium. ∎
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: 
To prove existence of an equilibrium, it suffices to show there exists a 
(σ, ϕ) ∈  [0, 1] 2 such that equation (9) holds (i.e.,  Q L (σ, σ, ϕ) =  v L ). Note that by 
varying  σ from 0 to 1,  Q L has a range  [(1 − δ)  c L + δ  v L , (1 − δ)  c L + δ  v H ] . By conti-
nuity of  Q L and Assumption 2, the intermediate value theorem gives the result.
 (i)  Low Trade (i.e.,  π i (g) =  _ π >  π i (b) ).—That there is at most one 
low trade equilibrium follows from the fact that the trading inten-
sity  σ is fully pinned down by the requirement that  π i (g) =  _ π. Let  x be 
such that  π i (g; x, x) =  _ π, and note that  x is decreasing in  λ . As  ϕ varies 
from  0 and  1 ,  Q L (x, x, ϕ) varies continuously from  (1 − δ)  c L + δ  v L to (1 − δ)  c L + δ(λx ·  v L + (1 − λx) ·  c H ) . Hence, there exists a  δ ˆλ < 1 , such 
that  Q L (x, x, 1) =  v L when  δ =  δ ˆλ . Clearly, a low trade equilibrium exists 
if  δ >  δ ˆλ . Moreover,  sup λ∈(1−π, 1)  λx < 1 . Hence  _ δ ≡  sup λ∈(1−π, 1)   δ ˆλ < 1 .
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 (ii)  High Trade (i.e.,  π i (g) >  _ π =  π i (b) ).—That there is at most one high 
trade equilibrium follows from the fact that the trading intensity  σ is 
fully pinned down by the requirement that  π i (b) =  _ π. Let  y be such that 
 π i (b; y, y) =  _ π, and note that  y is increasing in  λ . As ϕ varies from  0 to  1 , 
 Q L (y, y, ϕ) varies continuously from  (1 − δ)  c L + δ(λy ·  v L + (1 − λy) · V( π i (g))) to  (1 − δ)  c L + δ(λy ·  c H + (1 − λy) · V( π i (g))) . Hence, we 
have  lim λ→1  λy = 1 , it follows that the range of  Q L converges to the inter-
val  ((1 − δ)  c L + δ  v L , (1 − δ)  c L + δ  c H ] as  λ goes to  1 . By Assumption  2 , 
 v L is inside this interval. This establishes the existence of a threshold  _ λδ 
such that the high trade equilibrium exists whenever  λ >  _ λδ .
  Notice that we can already conclude that the low and the high trade equilibria 
coexist whenever  δ >  _ δ and  λ >  _ λδ . We are thus left to show that there are 
at most two medium trade equilibria, and that there is only one medium trade 
equilibrium when these parametric conditions hold.
 (iii)  Medium Trade (i.e.,  π i (g) >  _ π >  π i (b) ).—We first show that there can be 
at most two medium trade equilibria. For the remainder of the proof, let  r be 
a candidate trading probability in a medium trade equilibrium (i.e., such that 
π(b; r, r) <  _ π < π(g; r, r) ). Then,
  Q L (r, r, · ) = (1 − δ)  c L + δ [ f  (r)  v H + (1 − f  (r) )  v L ], 
  where
  f  (r) =  ( 1 _______ 1 −  ρ L (b) +  1 − r _______ 1 −  ρ H (b) ·  1 − π ____π ) 
−1 ,
and  ρ θ (b) = r Pr ( θ j = L |  θ i = θ) for  θ ∈  {L, H} . It can be shown that  f (r) 
is continuously differentiable and the equation  f  ′  (r) = 0 has at most one 
solution in  (0, 1) , which implies that  Q L is equal to  v L for at most two values 
of  r . This establishes that there can be at most two medium trade equilibria.
Suppose that the low and the high trade equilibria coexist. For existence, let 
x, y be defined by
  π i (b; y, y) =  _ π =  π i (g; x, x). 
From the monotonicity of posteriors in the trading probability, we have 
r ∈ (x, y) . Since the low and the high trade equilibria coexist, there exist 
ϕ′, ϕ″ ∈ (0, 1) such that  Q L (x, x, ϕ′ ) =  Q L (y, y, ϕ″ ) =  v L .24 Now, note 
that  lim r↓x   Q L (r, r, · ) =  Q L (x, x, 1) and  lim r↑y   Q L (r, r, · ) =  Q L (y, y, 0) . But 
then, because  Q L (x, x, 1) >  Q L (x, x, ϕ′ ) =  Q L (y, y, ϕ″ ) >  Q L (y, y, 0) , 
the intermediate value theorem implies that there must exist an  r ′ such 
that  Q L (r′, r′, · ) =  v L .
24 We ignore non-generic cases where either  ϕ′ = 1 or  ϕ″ = 0 , which are ruled out when  δ >  _ δ and  λ >  _ λδ . 
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For uniqueness, we proceed by contradiction. Suppose that there 
also exists an  r″ such that  r″ > r ′ and  Q L (r ″, r ″, · ) =  v L . Recall that 
 Q L intersects  v L for at most two values of  r , namely  r ′ and  r″ , when-
ever  π(b; r, r) <  _ π < π(g; r, r) . Then either (i)  Q L (r, r, · ) <  v L for all 
r ∈ (x, r′ ) ∪ (r ″, y) or (ii)  Q L (r, r, · ) >  v L for all  r ∈ (x, r′ ) ∪ (r″, y) . But 
recall that  lim r↓x   Q L (r, r, · ) =  Q L (x, x, 1) >  Q L (x, x, ϕ′ ) =  v L which con-
tradicts (i), and  lim r↑y   Q L (r, r, ⋅ ) =  Q L (y, y, 0) <  Q L (y, y, ϕ″ ) =  v L which 
contradicts (ii). Thus, there exists one medium trade equilibrium.
The convergence of the trading probability to  
_ σ, as  λ goes to  1 − π , 
follows from the following observation. In any equilibrium,  π i (b) ≤  _ π≤  π i (g) (see discussion preceding Theorem 1). Hence, by continu-
ity of posteriors in  λ and  σ , we have  lim λ→1−π   π i (b) =  lim λ→1−π   π i (g) =  lim λ→1−π   π σ =  _ π, and therefore  lim λ→1−π  σ =  _ σ. Let us now con sider 
the uniqueness argument.
Consider  δ 0 ∈ (0, 1) defined by
  v L =  (1 −  δ 0 )  c L +  δ 0 ((1 − π) _ σ ·  v L +  (1 − (1 − π) _ σ) ·  c H ) . 
We now show that a sufficient condition for the equilibrium to be unique 
for  λ close to  1 − π is that  δ ≠  δ 0 (hence our qualifier that the equilib-
rium is generically unique). As  λ approaches  1 − π , in equilibrium poste-
riors converge as well. In particular, we have that for  r satisfying  π(b; r, r) 
<  _ π < π(g; r, r) :
  lim λ→1−π 
   Q L (r, r, ϕ) 
   =  (1 − δ)  c L + δ [(1 − π) _ σ ·  v L +  (1 − (1 − π) _ σ) ·  c H ] . 
But if  δ ≠  δ 0 , then for  λ close to  1 − π , a medium trade equilibrium can-
not exist, because otherwise we cannot have  Q L =  v L as required by (9). 
Thus, we have ruled out the medium trade equilibrium. But from our earlier 
arguments, the low and the high trade equilibrium generically do not coexist 
when the medium trade equilibrium does not exist. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: 
See text for the arguments for the high and low trade equilibria. For the medium 
trade equilibria, the proof is by example (see Figure 4, panel A). 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: 
The welfare of the high type in the low trade equilibrium is  c H . Also, note that 
in the medium and high trade equilibria, we have that the posterior following good 
news satisfies  π i (g) >  _ π, which implies that in those equilibria the high type’s 
welfare is strictly above  c H . Thus, welfare in the high or medium trade equilibria 
is higher than in the low trade equilibrium. We are left to rank the welfare in the 
medium and high trade equilibria and demonstrate the comparative statics results.
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For the welfare ranking, note that  π i (b;  σ med ,  σ med ) <  _ π =  π i (b;  σ high ,  σ high ) , 
and  σ high >  σ med . We know that  Q H i is increasing in  σ i and in  σ j by Lemma A.1  (ii) 
as both increase from  σ med to  σ high . Hence,  Q H high >  Q H med .
For the comparative statics, note that in the low trade equilibrium  π i (g) =  _ π; 
therefore,  Q H low =  c H for all  λ . In high trade equilibrium, we have  π i (b) =  _ π, 
which implies that the equilibrium trading intensity  σ high is increasing with  λ . Fixing 
σ such that  π i (b) =  _ π,  Q H i increases with  λ , since  ρ H i (b) and  π i (b) decrease with λ ,  π i (g) increases with  λ , and because
  Q H i = (1 − δ)  c H + δ( ρ H i (b)  c H + (1 −  ρ H i (b)) V( π i (g)) ,
for all such  λ . But using the argument above, we know that  Q H i increases with  σ as it 
increases to the new equilibrium value  σ high . Hence,  Q H high increases with  λ . Finally, 
that welfare in the medium trade equilibrium can be decreasing with  λ is illustrated 
in Figure 4. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: 
In an opaque market, the equilibrium trading probability is  
_ σ satisfying 
 π  _ σ =  _ π as in Proposition 1, and the high type’s payoff is  c H . With post-trade trans-
parency, all buyers observe all transactions and thus, the set of equilibria are the 
same as in Theorem 1 and welfare is as in Proposition 5. Thus, there are multiple 
equilibria (i.e., low, medium, high trade) if  λ >  _ λδ , and the equilibrium is unique (and given by the low trade equilibrium) when  λ is sufficiently small. This follows 
from the fact that the low trade equilibrium exists when  δ >  _ δ and that the equilib-
rium is unique for  λ sufficiently small.
When  λ >  _ λδ , trade volume can increase or decrease. This follows from the 
observation that  σ low <  _ σ <  σ high since posterior beliefs are monotonic in 
σ ,  π i (b) <  π σ <  π i (g) , and  π i (b;  σ high ,  σ high ) =  π i (g;  σ low ,  σ low ) =  _ π. In the 
medium and high trade equilibria, welfare is greater than in the low trade equi-
librium (see Proposition 5), which is equal to welfare when the market is opaque. 
Thus, welfare increases if multiple equilibria exist and agents play the medium 
or high trade equilibrium, but remains unchanged if the low trade equilibrium is 
played, which completes the argument for  (i) .
To complete the argument for  (ii) , recall that when  λ is sufficiently small and 
δ >  _ δ, the unique equilibrium involves  π i (g) =  _ π (hence  σ <  _ σ) and  Q H i =  c H . 
Hence, introducing post-trade transparency reduces trade volume while welfare 
remains unchanged. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7: 
If investors are naïve, they are unaware there is an additional informed buyer 
in the market and thus they bid as if they were in an opaque market. Since there 
are many naïve investors and one insider, the second highest bid is always deter-
mined by the naïve investors. Thus the equilibrium distribution of bids and trading 
 probability  σ are as in the case without information spillovers (as in Proposition 1), 
which means that the welfare of the seller and the total welfare also coincide, and 
are the same as in the low trade equilibrium in Proposition 5.
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For the insider, it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid his expected value when it 
is above  c H and  v L otherwise. When there is good news his expected value is strictly 
above  c H . When there is bad news his expected value is below  c H , and thus he will 
bid at most  v L .
Given the equilibrium bidding and trading strategies described above, the 
informed buyer always wins the auction when he observes good news and makes 
zero profit following bad news. Hence, the informed buyer makes rents since the 
fact he observed good news raises his posterior expected value above the price he 
pays (either  v L or  c H ). When the naïve investors win the auction, it must have been 
that the insider observed bad news. They fall prey to the winner’s curse. The true 
expected value of the asset is below  c H and thus they make losses in expectation. 
Since total surplus and the sellers’ welfare is identical to the low trade equilibrium, 
it immediately follows that the rents made by the informed are exactly offset by the 
losses of the uninformed. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8: 
As in the case with naïve investors, it is a weakly dominant strategy for the 
insider to offer his expected value of the asset (i.e.,  V( π i (z)) ) if it is above  c H and  v L 
otherwise. In an opaque market, sophisticated investors do not observe news, but 
they are aware that if they bid solely based on their interim posterior, they would 
only win when the informed buyer observes bad news (as detailed in the proof of 
Proposition 7). The only way to avoid these loses is by bidding as if they observed 
bad news. This way they never overbid for the asset. If  π i (b) >  _ π, then the bid in 
the second period would always be above  c H and the low type would not be willing 
to trade in the first period. Hence,  π i (b) ≤  _ π and sophisticated investors can only 
bid  c H or something weakly less than  v L . Since there is only one insider, the price 
will again be set by the investors.
Given the bidding behavior described above, our condition for equilibrium 
becomes
  v L =  (1 − δ)  c L + δ  F L ( π i (b),  ϕ i ). 
Assumptions  1 and  2 imply that the only possible solution must involve 
 π i (b) =  _ π. Hence, there is a unique equilibrium  σ , which is such that 
 π i (b; σ, σ) =  _ π. Notice that this equilibrium involves a higher  σ than in the low 
trade equilibrium since  π i (b) <  π  σ i  .
Clearly, both the low type and the sophisticated investors have the same payoffs 
as in the low trade equilibrium of Theorem 1 (i.e.,  v L and  0 ). The high type’s payoff 
is also the same as in the low-trade equilibrium since he gets  c H at  t = 2 regardless 
of the realization of news. The insider, however, makes positive expected profits 
since after observing good news he buys the asset for  c H but when the expected value 
is  V( π i (g)) >  c H . ∎
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